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Abstrat
Despite the signiant progress in multiagent teamwork, existing researh does not ad-
dress the optimality of its presriptions nor the omplexity of the teamwork problem. With-
out a haraterization of the optimality-omplexity tradeos, it is impossible to determine
whether the assumptions and approximations made by a partiular theory gain enough
eÆieny to justify the losses in overall performane. To provide a tool for use by mul-
tiagent researhers in evaluating this tradeo, we present a unied framework, the COM-
muniative Multiagent Team Deision Problem (COM-MTDP). The COM-MTDP model
ombines and extends existing multiagent theories, suh as deentralized partially observ-
able Markov deision proesses and eonomi team theory. In addition to their generality
of representation, COM-MTDPs also support the analysis of both the optimality of team
performane and the omputational omplexity of the agents' deision problem. In analyz-
ing omplexity, we present a breakdown of the omputational omplexity of onstruting
optimal teams under various lasses of problem domains, along the dimensions of observ-
ability and ommuniation ost. In analyzing optimality, we exploit the COM-MTDP's
ability to enode existing teamwork theories and models to enode two instantiations of
joint intentions theory taken from the literature. Furthermore, the COM-MTDP model
provides a basis for the development of novel team oordination algorithms. We derive a
domain-independent riterion for optimal ommuniation and provide a omparative anal-
ysis of the two joint intentions instantiations with respet to this optimal poliy. We have
implemented a reusable, domain-independent software pakage based on COM-MTDPs to
analyze teamwork oordination strategies, and we demonstrate its use by enoding and
evaluating the two joint intentions strategies within an example domain.
1. Introdution
A entral hallenge in the ontrol and oordination of distributed agents is enabling them
to work together, as a team, toward a ommon goal. Suh teamwork is ritial in a vast
range of domains|for future teams of orbiting spaeraft, sensors for traking targets, un-
manned vehiles for urban battleelds, software agents for assisting organizations in rapid
risis response, et. Researh in teamwork theory has built the foundations for suessful
pratial agent team implementations in suh domains. On the forefront are theories based
on belief-desire-intentions (BDI) frameworks, suh as joint intentions (Cohen & Levesque,
1991b, 1991a; Levesque, Cohen, & Nunes, 1990), SharedPlans (Grosz, 1996; Grosz & Kraus,
1996; Grosz & Sidner, 1990), and others (Sonenberg, Tidhar, Werner, Kinny, Ljungberg,
& Rao, 1994; Dunin-Kepliz & Verbrugge, 1996), that have provided presriptions for o-
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ordination in pratial systems. These theories have inspired the onstrution of prati-
al, domain-independent teamwork models and arhitetures (Jennings, 1995; Pynadath,
Tambe, Chauvat, & Cavedon, 1999; Rih & Sidner, 1997; Tambe, 1997; Yen, Yin, Ioerger,
Miller, Xu, & Volz, 2001), suessfully applied in a range of omplex domains.
Yet, two key shortomings limit the salability of these BDI-based theories and imple-
mentations. First, there are no tehniques for the quantitative evaluation of the degree of
optimality of their oordination behavior. While optimal teamwork may be impratial in
real-world domains, suh analysis would aid us in omparison of dierent theories/models
and in identifying feasible improvements. One key reason for the diÆulty in quantitative
evaluation of most existing teamwork theories is that they ignore the various unertain-
ties and osts in real-world environments. For instane, joint intentions theory (Cohen &
Levesque, 1991b) presribes that team members attain mutual beliefs in key irumstanes,
but it ignores the ost of attaining mutual belief (e.g., via ommuniation). Implementa-
tions that blindly follow suh presriptions ould engage in highly suboptimal oordination.
On the other hand, pratial systems have addressed osts and unertainties of real-world
environments. For instane, STEAM (Tambe, 1997; Tambe & Zhang, 1998) extends joint
intentions with deision-theoreti ommuniation seletivity. Unfortunately, the very prag-
matism of suh approahes often neessarily leads to a lak of theoretial rigor, so it remains
unanswered whether STEAM's seletivity is the best an agent an do, or whether it is even
neessary at all. The seond key shortoming of existing teamwork researh is the lak
of a haraterization of the omputational omplexity of various aspets of teamwork dei-
sions. Understanding the omputational advantages of a pratial oordination presription
ould potentially justify the use of that presription as an approximation to optimality in
partiular domains.
To address these shortomings, we propose a new omplementary framework, the COM-
muniative Multiagent Team Deision Problem (COM-MTDP), inspired by work in eo-
nomi team theory (Marshak & Radner, 1971; Yoshikawa, 1978; Ho, 1980). While our
COM-MTDP model borrows from a theory developed in another eld, we make several
ontributions in applying and extending the original theory, most notably adding expliit
models of ommuniation and system dynamis. With these extensions, the COM-MTDP
generalizes other reently developed multiagent deision frameworks, suh as deentralized
POMDPs (Bernstein, Zilberstein, & Immerman, 2000).
Our denition of a team (like that in eonomi team theory) assumes only that team
members have a ommon goal and that they work selessly towards that goal (i.e., they
have no other private goals of their own). In terms of our deision-theoreti framework, we
assume that all of the team members share the same joint utility funtion|that is, eah
team member's individual preferenes are exatly the preferenes of the other members and,
thus, of the team as a whole. Our denition may appear to be a \bare-bones" denition of
a team, sine it does not inlude ommon onepts and assumptions from the literature on
what onstitutes a team (e.g., the teammates form a joint ommitment (Cohen & Levesque,
1991b), attain mutual belief upon termination of a joint goal, intend that teammates su-
eed in their tasks (Grosz & Kraus, 1996), et.). From our COM-MTDP perspetive, we
view these onepts as more intermediate onepts, as the means by whih agents improve
their team's overall performane, rather than ends in themselves. Our hypothesis in this
investigation is that our COM-MTDP-based analysis an provide onrete justiations for
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these onepts. For example, while mutual belief has no inherent value, our COM-MTDP
model an quantify the improved performane that we would expet from a team that
attains mutual belief about important aspets of its exeution.
More generally, this paper demonstrates three new types of teamwork analyses made
possible by the COM-MTDP model. First, we analyze the omputational omplexity of
teamwork within sublasses of problem domains. For instane, some researhers have ad-
voated teamwork without ommuniation (Goldberg & Matari, 1997). We use the COM-
MTDP model to show that, in general, the problem of onstruting optimal teams without
ommuniation is NEXP-omplete, but allowing free ommuniation redues the problem
to be PSPACE-omplete. This paper presents a breakdown of the omplexity of optimal
teamwork over problem domains lassied along the dimensions of observability and om-
muniation ost.
Seond, the COM-MTDP model provides a powerful tool for omparing the optimality
of dierent oordination presriptions aross lasses of domains. Indeed, we illustrate that
we an enode existing team oordination strategies within a COM-MTDP for evaluation.
For our analysis, we seleted two joint intentions-based approahes from the literature: one
using the approah realized within GRATE* and the joint responsibility model (Jennings,
1995), and another based on STEAM (Tambe, 1997). Through this enoding, we derive the
onditions under whih these team oordination strategies generate optimal team behavior,
and the omplexity of the deision problems addressed by them. Furthermore, we also
derive a novel team oordination algorithm that outperforms these existing strategies in
optimality, though not in eÆieny. The end result is a well-grounded haraterization of
the omplexity-optimality tradeo among various means of team oordination.
Third, we an use the COM-MTDP model to empirially analyze a spei domain of
interest. We have implemented reusable, domain-independent algorithms that allow one to
evaluate the optimality of the behavior generated by dierent presriptive poliies within a
problem domain represented as a COM-MTDP. We apply these algorithms in an example
domain to empirially evaluate the aforementioned team oordination strategies, hara-
terizing the optimality of eah strategy as a funtion of the properties of the underlying
domain. For instane, Jennings reports experimental results (Jennings, 1995) indiating
that his joint responsibility teamwork model leads to lower waste of ommunity eort than
ompeting methods of aomplishing teamwork. With our COM-MTDP model, we were
able to demonstrate the benets of Jennings' approah under many ongurations of our ex-
ample domain. However, in preisely haraterizing the types of domains that showed suh
benets, we also identied domains where these ompeting methods may atually perform
better. In addition, we an use our COM-MTDP model to re-reate and explain previous
work that noted an instane of suboptimality in a STEAM-based, real-world implementa-
tion (Tambe, 1997). While this previous work treated that suboptimality as anomalous, our
COM-MTDP re-evaluation of the domain demonstrated that the observed suboptimality
was a symptom of STEAM's general propensity towards extraneous ommuniation in a
signiant range of domain types. Both the algorithms and the example domain model are
available for publi use in an Online Appendix 1.
Setion 2 presents the COM-MTDP model's representation and plaes it in the ontext
of related multiagent models from the literature. Setion 3 uses the COM-MTDP model to
dene and haraterize the omplexity of designing optimal agent teams. Setion 4 analyzes
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the optimality of existing team oordination algorithms and derives a novel oordination
algorithm. Setion 5 presents empirial results from applying our COM-MTDP algorithms
to an example domain. Setion 6 summarizes our results, and Setion 7 identies some
promising future diretions.
2. The COM-MTDP Model
This setion denes and desribes the COM-MTDP model itself and its ability to represent
the important aspets of multiagent teamwork. We begin in Setion 2.1 by dening the
underlying multiagent team deision problem with no expliit ommuniation. Setion 2.2
denes the omplete COM-MTDP model with its extension to expliitly represent ommu-
niation. Setion 2.3 provides an illustration of how the COM-MTDP model represents the
exeution of a team of agents. Finally, Setion 2.4 desribes related models of multiagent
oordination and shows how the COM-MTDP model generalizes them.
2.1 Multiagent Team Deision Problems
Given a team of seless agents, , who intend to perform some joint task, we wish to evaluate
possible poliies of behavior. We represent a multiagent team deision problem (MTDP)
model as a tuple, hS;A

; P;


;O

;B

; Ri. We have taken the underlying omponents of
this model from the initial team deision model (Ho, 1980), but we have extended them to
handle dynami deisions over time and to more easily represent multiagent domains (in
partiular, agent beliefs). We assume that the model is ommon knowledge to all of the
team members. In other words, all of the agents believe the same model, and they believe
that they all believe the same model, et.
2.1.1 World States: S
 S = 
1
     
m
: a set of world states, expressed as a fatored representation (a
ross produt of separate features).
The state of the world here is the state of the team's environment (e.g., terrain, loation of
enemy). Thus, eah 
i
represents the domain of an individual feature of that environment,
while S represents the domain of all possible ombinations of values over the individual
features.
2.1.2 Domain-Level Ations: A

fA
i
g
i2
is a set of ations for eah agent to perform to hange its environment, impliitly
dening a set of ombined ations, A


Q
i2
A
i
(orresponding to team theory's deision
variables).
Extension to Dynami Problem: P The original team deision problem foused on
a one-shot, stati problem. We extend the original onept so that eah omponent is a
time series of random variables. The eets of domain-level ations (e.g., a ying ation
hanges a heliopter's position) obey a probabilisti distribution, given by a funtion P :
S A

 S ! [0; 1℄. In other words, for eah initial state s at time t, ombined ation a
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taken at time t, and nal state s
0
at time t+ 1, Pr(S
t+1
= s
0
jS
t
= s;A
t

= a) = P (s;a; s
0
).
The given denition of P assumes that the world dynamis obey the Markov assumption.
2.1.3 Agent Observations: 


f

i
g
i2
is a set of observations that eah agent, i, an experiene of its world, impliitly
dening a ombined observation, 



Q
i2


i
. 

i
may inlude elements orresponding
to indiret evidene of the state (e.g., sensor readings) and ations of other agents (e.g.,
movement of other heliopters). In the original team-theoreti framework, the information
struture that represented the observation proess of the agents was a set of deterministi
funtions, O
i
: S ! 

i
.
Extension of Allowable Information Strutures: O

We extend the information
struture representation to allow for unertain observations. We use a general stohasti
model, borrowed from the partially observable Markov deision proess model (Smallwood &
Sondik, 1973), with a joint observation funtion: O

(s;a;!) = Pr(

t

= !jS
t
= s;A
t 1

=
a). This funtion models the sensors, representing any errors, noise, et. In some ases, we
an separate this joint distribution into individual observation funtions: O


Q
i2
O
i
,
where O
i
(s;a; !) = Pr(

t
i
= !jS
t
= s;A
t 1

= a). Thus, the probability distribution
speied by O

forms the riher information struture used in our model. We an make
useful distintions between dierent lasses of information strutures:
Colletive Partial Observability This is the general ase, where we make no assump-
tions on the observations.
Colletive Observability There is a unique world state for the ombined observations of
the team: 8! 2 


, 9s 2 S suh that 8s
0
6= s, Pr(

t

= !jS
t
= s
0
) = 0. The set
of domains that are olletively observable is a strit subset of the domains that are
olletively partially observable.
Individual Observability There is a unique world state for eah individual agent's ob-
servations: 8! 2 

i
, 9s 2 S suh that 8s
0
6= s, Pr(

t
i
= !jS
t
= s
0
) = 0. The set
of domains that are individually observable is a strit subset of the domains that are
olletively observable.
Non-Observability The agents reeive no feedbak from the world: 9! 2 

i
, suh that
8s 2 S and 8a 2 A

, Pr(

t
i
= !jS
t
= s;A
t 1

= a) = 1. This assumption holds
in open-loop systems, whih ome under frequent onsideration in lassial plan-
ning (Boutilier, Dean, & Hanks, 1999).
2.1.4 Poliy (Strategy) Spae

iA
is a domain-level poliy (or strategy, in the original team theory speiation) to map
an agent's belief state to an ation. In the original formalism, the agent's beliefs orrespond
diretly to its observations (i.e., 
iA
: 

i
! A
i
).
Extension to Riher Belief State Spae: B

We generalize the set of possible strate-
gies to apture the more omplex mental states of the agents. Eah agent, i 2 , forms a
belief state, b
t
i
2 B
i
, based on its observations seen through time t, where B
i
irumsribes
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the set of possible belief states for the agent. Thus, we dene the set of possible domain-
level poliies as mappings from belief states to ations, 
iA
: B
i
! A
i
. We dene the set
of possible ombined belief states over all agents to be B


Q
i2
B
i
. The orresponding
random variable, b
t

, represents the agents' ombined belief state at time t. We elaborate
on dierent types of belief states and the mapping of observations to belief states (i.e., the
state estimator funtion) in Setion 2.2.1.
2.1.5 Reward Funtion: R
A ommon reward funtion is entral to the notion of teamwork in a MTDP: R : SA

!
R. This funtion represents the team's joint preferenes over states and the ost of domain-
level ations (e.g., destroying enemy is good, returning to home base with only 10% of
original fore is bad). We assume that, as seless team members, eah agent shares these
preferenes at the individual level as well. Therefore, eah team member wants exatly
what is best for the team as a whole.
2.2 Extension for Expliit Communiation: 

We make an expliit separation between domain-level ations (A

) and ommuniative
ations. As dened in this setion, ommuniative ations aet the reeiving agents' indi-
vidual belief states, but, unlike domain-level ations, they do not diretly hange the world
state. Although this distintion is sometimes blurry in real-world domains, we make this
expliit separation so as to isolate, as muh as possible, the eets of the two types of
ations. The leverage gained from this separation provides the basis for the informative,
analytial results presented in the rest of this paper. To apture this separation, we extend
our initial MTDP model to be a ommuniative multiagent team deision problem (COM-
MTDP), that we dene as a tuple, hS;A

;

; P;


;O

;B

; Ri, with a new omponent,


, and an extended reward funtion, R.
2.2.1 Communiation: 

f
i
g
i2
is a set of possible messages for eah agent, impliitly dening a set of ombined
ommuniations, 


Q
i2

i
. An agent, i, may ommuniate message x 2 
i
to its
teammates, who interpret the ommuniation by updating their belief states in response. As
a rst step in this work, we assume that all of the agents reeive the messages instantaneously
and orretly (i.e., there is no lag or noise in the ommuniation hannels). This model is
ommon knowledge among all of the team members, so one an agent has sent a message,
it knows that its team members have reeived the message, and its team members know
that it knows that they have all reeived the message, and so on.
With ommuniation, we divide eah deision epoh into two phases: the pre-ommuni-
ation and post-ommuniation phases, denoted by the subsripts  and , respetively.
In partiular, the agents update their belief states at two distint points within eah de-
ision epoh: one upon reeiving observation 

t
i
(produing the pre-ommuniation be-
lief state b
t
i
), and again upon reeiving the other agents' messages (produing the post-
ommuniation belief state b
t
i
). The distintion allows us to dierentiate between the belief
state used by the agents in seleting their ommuniation ations and the more \up-to-date"
belief state used in seleting their domain-level ations. We also distinguish between the
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separate state-estimator funtions used in eah update phase:
b
0
i
=SE
0
i
() (1)
b
t
i
=SE
i
(b
t 1
i
;

t
i
) (2)
b
t
i
=SE
i
(b
t
i
;
t

) (3)
where SE
i
: B
i
 

i
! B
i
is the pre-ommuniation state estimator for agent i, and
SE
i
: B
i


! B
i
is the post-ommuniation state estimator for agent i. The initial
state estimator, SE
0
i
: ; ! B
i
, speies the agent's prior beliefs, before any observations
are made. For eah of these, we also make the obvious denitions for the orresponding
estimators for the ombined belief states: SE

, SE

, and SE
0

.
In this paper, as a rst step, we assume that the agents have perfet reall. In other
words, the agents reall all of their observations, as well as all ommuniation of the other
agents. Thus, their belief states an represent their entire histories as sequenes of obser-
vations and reeived messages: B
i
= 


i
 


, where X

denotes the set of all possible
sequenes (of any length) of elements of X. The agents realize perfet reall through the
following state estimator funtions:
SE
0
i
() = hi (4)
SE
i
(





0
i
;
0


; : : : ;




t 1
i
;
t 1


;

t
i
)
=





0
i
;
0


; : : : ;




t 1
i
;
t 1


;




t
i
; 

(5)
SE
i
(





0
i
;
0


; : : : ;




t 1
i
;
t 1


;




t
i
; 

;
t

)
=





0
i
;
0


; : : : ;




t
i
;
t


(6)
In other words, SE
0
i
initializes agent i's belief state to be an empty history, SE
i
appends a
new observation to agent i's belief state, and SE
i
appends new messages to agent i's belief
state. Under this paper's assumptions of perfet reall, all three state-estimator funtions
take only onstant time. However, we an potentially allow more omplex funtions (though
the omplexity results presented hold only if the state-estimator funtions take polynomial
time). For instane, although we assume perfet, synhronous, instantaneous ommunia-
tion here, we ould potentially use the post-ommuniation state estimator to model any
noise, temporal delays, asynhrony, ognitive burden, et. present in the ommuniation
hannel.
We extend our denition of a poliy of behavior to inlude a ommuniation poliy,

i
: B
i
! 
i
, analogous to Setion 2.1.4's domain-level poliy. We dene the joint poliies,


and 
A
, as the ombined poliies aross all agents in .
2.2.2 Extended Reward Funtion: R
We extend the team's reward funtion to also represent the ost of ommuniative ats (e.g.,
ommuniation hannels may have assoiated ost): R : SA



! R. We assume that
the ost of ommuniation and of domain-level ations are independent of eah other, so we
an deompose the reward funtion into two omponents: a ommuniation-level reward,
R

: S  

! R, and a domain-level reward, R
A
: S  A

! R. The total reward is
the sum of the two omponent values: R(s;a;) = R
A
(s;a) + R

(s;). We assume that
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ommuniation has no inherent benet and may instead have some ost, so that for all
states, s 2 S, and messages,  2 

, the reward is never positive: R

(s;)  0. However,
although we assign ommuniation no expliit value, it an have signiant impliit value
through its eet on the agents' belief states and, subsequently, on their future ations.
As with the observability funtion, we parameterize the ommuniation osts assoiated
with message transmissions:
General Communiation: We make no assumptions about ommuniation.
Free Communiation: R

(s;) = 0 for any  2 

, and s 2 S. In other words,
ommuniation ations have no eet on the agents' reward.
No ommuniation: 

= ;, i.e., no expliit ommuniation. Alternatively, ommunia-
tion may be prohibitively expensive, so that 8 2 

, and s 2 S, R

(s;) =  1.
The free-ommuniation ase appears in the literature, when researhers wish to fous
on issues other than ommuniation ost. Although, real-world domains rarely exhibit
suh ideal onditions, we may be able to model some domains as having approximately free
ommuniation to a suÆient degree. In addition, analyzing this extreme ase gives us some
understanding of the benet of ommuniation, even if the results do not apply aross all
domains. We also identify the no-ommuniation ase beause suh deision problems have
been of interest to researhers as well (Goldberg &Matari, 1997). Of ourse, even if

= ;,
it is possible that there are domain-level ations in A

that have impliit ommuniative
value by ating as signals that onvey information to the other agents. However, we still
label suh agent teams as having no ommuniation for the purposes of the work here, sine
many of our results exploit an expliit separation between domain- and ommuniation-level
ations.
2.3 Model Illustration
We an view the evolving state as a Markov hain with separate stages for domain-level
and ommuniation-level ations. In other words, eah agent team member, i 2  begins
in some initial state, S
0
, with initial belief states, b
0
i
= SE
0
i
(). Eah agent reeives an
observation 

0
i
drawn aording to the probability distribution O

(S
0
;null;

0

) (there are
no ations yet). Then, eah agent updates its belief state, b
0
i
= SE
i
(b
0
i
;

0
i
).
Next, eah agent i 2  selets a message aording to its ommuniation poliy, 
0
i
=

i
(b
0
i
), dening a ombined ommuniation, 
0

. Eah agent interprets the ommu-
niations of all of the others by updating its belief state, b
0
i
= SE
i
(b
0
i
;
0

). Eah
then selets an ation aording to its domain-level poliy, A
0
i
= 
iA
(b
0
i
), dening a
ombined ation A
0

. By our entral assumption of teamwork, eah agent reeives the
same joint reward, R
0
= R(S
0
;A
0

;
0

). The world then moves into a new state, S
1
,
aording to the distribution, P (S
0
;A
0

). Again, eah agent i reeives an observation 

1
i
drawn from 

i
aording to the distributionO

(S
1
;A
0

;

1

), and it updates its belief state,
b
1
i
= SE
i
(b
0
i
;

1
i
).
The proess ontinues, with agents hoosing ommuniation- and domain-level ations,
observing the eets, and updating their beliefs. Thus, in addition to the time series of world
states, S
0
; S
1
; : : : ; S
t
, the agents themselves determine a time series of ommuniation-level
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and domain-level ations, 
0

;
1

; : : : ;
t

and A
1

;A
1

; : : : ;A
t

, respetively. We also have
a time series of observations for eah agent i, 

0
i
;

1
i
; : : : ;

t
i
. Likewise, we an treat the
ombined observations, 

0

;

1

; : : : ;

t

, as a similar time series of random variables.
Finally, the agents reeive a series of rewards, R
0
; R
1
; : : : ; R
t
. We an dene the value,
V , of the poliies, 
A
and 

, as the expeted reward reeived when exeuting those
poliies. Over a nite horizon, T , this value is equivalent to the following:
V
T
(
A
;

) = E
"
T
X
t=0
R
t






A
;

#
(7)
2.4 Related Work
The COM-MTDP model subsumes many existing multiagent models, as presented in Ta-
ble 1 (i.e., we an map any instane of these models into a orresponding COM-MTDP).
This generality enables us to perform novel analyses of real-world teamwork domains, as
demonstrated by Setion 4's use of the COM-MTDP model for analyzing the optimality of
ommuniation deisions.
2.4.1 Deentralized POMDPs
With its model of observability and world dynamis, our COM-MTDP model losely par-
allels the struture of the deentralized partially observable Markov deision proess (DEC-
POMDP) (Bernstein et al., 2000). Following our notational onventions, a DEC-POMDP
is a tuple, hS;A

; P;


; O

; Ri. There is no set of possible messages, 

, so the DEC-
POMDP falls into the lass of domains with no ommuniation. The DEC-POMDP obser-
vational model, O, is general enough to apture olletively partially observable domains.
2.4.2 Partially Observable Idential Payoff Stohasti Games
Stohasti games provide a rih framework for multiagent deision making when the agents
may have their own individual goals and preferenes. The idential payo stohasti game
(IPSG) restrits the agents to share a single payo funtion, appropriate for modeling
the single, global reward funtion of the team ontext. The partially observable IPSG
(POIPSG) (Peshkin, Kim, Meuleau, & Kaelbling, 2000) is a tuple, hS;A

; P;


;O

; Ri,
very similar to the DEC-POMDP model. In other words, the observation funtion, O

, is
general enough to support olletively partially observable domains, and there is no ommu-
niation.
2.4.3 Multiagent MDPs
Another relevant model is the multiagent Markov deision proess (MMDP) (Boutilier,
1996), whih is a tuple, hS;A

; P;Ri, in our notation. Like the DEC-POMDP, the MMDP
has no ommuniation. In addition, the MMDP is a multiagent extension to the ompletely
observable MDP model, so it assumes an environment that is individually observable.
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Model 

O

DEC-POMDP no ommuniation olletive partial observability
POIPSG no ommuniation olletive partial observability
MMDP no ommuniation individual observability
Xuan-Lesser general ommuniation olletive observability
Table 1: Existing models as COM-MTDP subsets.
2.4.4 Xuan-Lesser Framework
The COM-MTDP's separation of ommuniation from other ations is similar to previous
work on multiagent deision models (Xuan, Lesser, & Zilberstein, 2001), whih supported
general ommuniation. However, while the Xuan-Lesser model generalizes beyond indi-
vidually observable environments, it supports only a subset of olletively observable envi-
ronments. In partiular, the Xuan-Lesser framework annot represent agents who reeive
loal observations of a ommon world state, where the observations of dierent agents ould
potentially be interdependent.
3. COM-MTDP Complexity Analysis
We an use the COM-MTDP model to prove some results about the omplexity of on-
struting optimal agent teams (i.e., teams that oordinate to produe optimal behavior in
a problem domain). The problem faing these agents (or the designer of these agents) is
how to onstrut the joint poliies, 

and 
A
, so as to maximize their joint reward,
as represented by the expeted value, V
T
(
A
;

). In all of the results presented, we
assume that all of the values in a model instane (e.g., transition probabilities, rewards) are
rational numbers, so that we an express the partiular instane as a nite-sized input.
Theorem 1 The deision problem of whether there exist poliies, 

and 
A
, for a given
COM-MTDP, under general ommuniation and olletive partial observability, that yield
a total reward at least K over some nite horizon T is NEXP-omplete if jj  2 (i.e.,
more than one agent).
Proof: To prove that the COM-MTDP deision problem is NEXP-hard, we redue a DEC-
POMDP (Bernstein et al., 2000) to a COM-MTDP with no ommuniation by opying
all of the other model features from the given DEC-POMDP. In other words, if we are
given a DEC-POMDP,


S; fA
i
g
m
i=1
; P; f

i
g
m
i=1
; O;R

, we an onstrut a COM-MTDP,
hS
0
; fA
0
i
g
m
i=1
;
0

; P
0
; f

0
i
g
m
i=1
;O
0

;B
0

; R
0
i, as follows:
S
0
= S
A
0
i
= A
i

0
= ;
P
0
(s; ha
1
; : : : ; a
m
i ; s
0
) = P (s
0
js; a
1
; : : : ; a
m
)
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0
i
= 

i
O
0

(s; ha
1
; : : : ; a
m
i ; h!
1
; : : : ; !
m
i) = O(!
1
; : : : ; !
m
ja
1
; : : : ; a
m
; s)
B
0
i
= [
T
j=1
(

i
)
j
(i.e., observation sequenes of length no more than the nite horizon)
R
0
(s; ha
1
; : : : ; a
m
i ;) = R(s; a
1
; : : : ; a
m
)
The DEC-POMDP assumes perfet reall, so we use the state estimator funtions from
Equations 5 and 6. Sine there is no ommuniation for this COM-MTDP, we have a xed
silent poliy, 

. We an translate any domain-level poliy, 
A
, into a DEC-POMDP
joint poliy, Æ, as follows:
Æ
i
(o
i
1
; : : : ; o
i
t
)  
iA
(


o
i
1
; : : : ; o
i
t

) (8)
The expeted utility of following this joint poliy, Æ, within the DEC-POMDP is idential
to that of following 

and 
A
within the onstruted COM-MTDP. Thus, there exists
a poliy with expeted utility greater than K for the COM-MTDP if and only if there
exists one for the DEC-POMDP. The deision problem for a DEC-POMDP is known to be
NEXP-omplete, so the COM-MTDP problem must be NEXP-hard.
To show that the COM-MTDP is in NEXP, our proof proeeds similarly to that of
the DEC-POMDP. In other words, we guess the joint poliy, 

, and write it down in
exponential time (we assume that T  jSj). We an take the COM-MTDP plus the poliy
and generate (in exponential time) a orresponding MDP where the state spae is the spae
of all possible ombined belief states of the agents. We an then use dynami programming
to determine (in exponential time) whether 

generates an expeted reward of at least K.
2
In the remainder of this setion, we examine the eet of ommuniation on the om-
plexity of onstruting team poliies that generate optimal behavior. We start by examining
the ase under the ondition of free ommuniation, where we would expet the benet of
ommuniation to be the greatest. To begin with, suppose that eah agent is apable of
ommuniating its entire observation (i.e., 
i
 

i
). Before we analyze the omplexity of
the team deision problem, we rst prove that the agents should exploit this apability and
ommuniate their true observation, as long as they inur no ost in doing so:
Theorem 2 Under free ommuniation, onsider a team of agents using a ommuniation
poliy: 
i
(b
t
i
)  

t
i
. If the domain-level poliy 
A
maximizes V
T
(
A
;

), then this
ombined poliy is dominant over any other poliies. In other words, for all poliies, 
0
A
and 
0

, V
T
(
A
; 

)  V
T
(
0
A
;
0

).
Proof: Suppose we have some other ommuniation poliy, 
0

, that speies something
other than omplete ommuniation (e.g., keeping quiet, lying). Suppose that there is some
domain-level poliy, 
0
A
, that allows the team to attain some expeted reward, K, when
used in ombination with 
0

. Then, we an onstrut a domain-level poliy, 
A
, suh
that the team attains the same expeted reward, K, when used in onjuntion with the
omplete-ommuniation poliy, 

, as dened in the statement of Theorem 2.
The ommuniation poliy, 
0

, produes a dierent set of belief states (denoted b
0
t
i
and b
0
t
i
) than those for 

(denoted b
t
i
and b
t
i
). In partiular, we use state estimator
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funtions, SE
0
i
and SE
0
i
as dened in Equations 5 and 6 to generate b
0
t
i
and b
0
t
i
.
Eah belief state is a omplete history of observation and ommuniation pairs for eah
agent. On the other hand, under the omplete ommuniation of 

, the state estimator
funtions of Equations 5 and 6 redue to:
SE
i
(




0

; : : : ;

t 1


;

t
i
) =




0

; : : : ;

t 1

;

t
i

(9)
SE
i
(




0

; : : : ;

t 1

;

t
i

;
t

) =




0

; : : : ;

t 1

;
t


=




0

; : : : ;

t 1

;

t


(10)
Thus, 
A
is dened over a dierent set of belief states than 
0
A
. In order to determine
an equivalent 
A
, we must rst dene a reursive mapping, m, that translates the belief
states dened by 

into those dened by 
0

:
m
i
(b
t
i
) =m
i
 

b
t 1
i
;

t


= m
i
 

b
t 1
i
;




t
i
;

t


=
D
m
i
(b
t 1
i
);
D


t
i
;
0
t

EE
=
*
m
i
(b
t 1
i
);
*


t
i
;
Y
j2

0
t
j
++
=
*
m
i
(b
t 1
i
);
*


t
i
;
Y
j2

0
j
(SE
0
j
(m
j
(b
t 1
j
);

t
j
))
++
(11)
Given this mapping, we then speify: 
iA
(b
t
i
) = 
0
iA
(m
i
(b
t
i
)). Exeuting this domain-
level poliy, in onjuntion with the ommuniation poliy, 

, results in the idential
behavior as exeution of the alternate poliies, 
0
A
and 
0

. Therefore, the team following
the poliies, 
A
and 

will ahieve the same expeted value of K, as under 
0
A
and

0

. 2
Given this dominane of the omplete-ommuniation poliy, we an prove that the
problem of onstruting teams that oordinate optimally is simpler when ommuniation is
free.
Theorem 3 The deision problem of determining whether there exist poliies, 

and

A
, for a given COM-MTDP with free ommuniation under olletive partial observabil-
ity, that yield a total reward at least K over some nite horizon T is PSPACE-omplete.
Proof: To prove that the problem is PSPACE-hard, we redue the single-agent POMDP to
a COM-MTDP. In partiular, if we are given a POMDP, hS;A; P;
; O;Ri, we an onstrut
a COM-MTDP, hS
0
; A
0
1
;
0
1
; P
0
;

0
1
; O
0
1
; B
0
1
; R
0
i, for a single-agent team (i.e.,  = f1g):
S
0
= S
A
0
1
= A

0
1
= ;
P
0
(s; ha
1
i ; s
0
) = P (s; a
1
; s
0
)


0
1
= 
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O
0
1
(s; ha
1
i ; h!
1
i) = O(s; a
1
; !
1
)
B
0
1
= [
T
j=1
(
)
j
(i.e., observation sequenes of length no more than the nite horizon)
R
0
A
(s; ha
1
i) = R(s; a
1
)
R
0

(s;) = 0
This COM-MTDP satises our assumption of free ommuniation. The POMDP assumes
perfet reall, so we use the state estimator funtions from Equations 5 and 6. Just as in
the proof of Theorem 1, we an show that there exists a poliy with expeted utility greater
than K for this COM-MTDP if and only if there exists one for the POMDP. The deision
problem for the POMDP is known to be PSPACE-hard (Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987),
so the COM-MTDP problem under free ommuniation must be PSPACE-hard.
To show that the problem is in PSPACE, we take a COM-MTDP under free ommuni-
ation and redue it to a single-agent POMDP. In partiular, if we are given a COM-MTDP,
hS;A

;

; P; 


;O

;B

; Ri, we an onstrut a single-agent POMDP, hS
0
; A
0
; P
0
;

0
; O
0
;
R
0
i, as follows:
S
0
= S
A
0
= A

P
0
(s;a; s
0
) = P (s;a; s
0
)


0
= 


O
0
(s;a;!) = O

(s;a;!)
R
0
(s;a) = R
A
(s;a)
From Theorem 2, we need to onsider only the omplete-ommuniation poliy for the
COM-MTDP and this poliy has a zero reward. Therefore, the deision problem for the
COM-MTDP is simply to nd a domain-level poliy that produes an expeted reward
exeeding K. Given full ommuniation, the state estimator funtions for the COM-MTDP
(as shown in the proof of Theorem 2) redue to Equation 10. A poliy for our POMDP
speies an ation for eah and every history of observations: 
0
: [
T
j=1
(

0
)
j
! A
0
. The
history of observations for the single-agent POMDP orresponds to the belief states of our
COM-MTDP under full ommuniation. Therefore, we an translate a POMDP-poliy, 
0
,
into an equivalent domain-level poliy for the COM-MTDP:

A
(h!
0
;!
1
; : : : ;!
t
i)  
0
(h!
0
;!
1
; : : : ;!
t
i) (12)
A team following 
A
will perform the exat same domain-level ations as a single agent
following 
0
. Thus, there exists a poliy with expeted utility greater than K for the COM-
MTDP if and only if there exists one for the POMDP. The deision problem for a POMDP
is known to be in PSPACE (Papadimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987), so the COM-MTDP problem
(under free ommuniation) must be in PSPACE as well. 2
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Theorem 4 The deision problem of determining whether there exist poliies, 

and

A
, for a given COM-MTDP with free ommuniation and olletive observability, that
yield a total reward at least K over some nite horizon T is P-omplete.
Proof: The proof follows that of Theorem 3, but with a redution to and from the MDP
deision problem, rather than the POMDP. The MDP deision problem is P-omplete (Pa-
padimitriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987). 2
Theorem 5 The deision problem of determining whether there exist poliies, 

and

A
, for a given COM-MTDP with individual observability, that yield a total reward at
least K over some nite horizon T (given integers K and T ) is P-omplete.
Proof: The proof follows that of Theorem 4, exept that we an redue the problem to
and from an MDP regardless of what ommuniation poliy the team uses. 2
Theorem 6 The deision problem of determining whether there exist poliies, 

and

A
, for a given COM-MTDP with non-observability, that yield a total reward at least K
over some nite horizon T (given integers K and T ) is NP-omplete.
Proof: The proof follows that of Theorem 4, exept that we an redue the problem to and
from an single-agent non-observable MDP (NOMDP) regardless of what ommuniation
poliy the team uses. In partiular, beause the agents are all equally ignorant of the state,
ommuniation has no eet. The NOMDP deision problem is NP-omplete (Papadim-
itriou & Tsitsiklis, 1987). 2
Thus, we have used the COM-MTDP framework to haraterize the diÆulty of problem
domains in agent teamwork along the dimensions of ommuniation ost and observability.
Table 2 summarizes our results, whih we an use in deiding where to onentrate our
energies in attaking teamwork problems. We an use these results to draw some onlusions
about the hallenges to designers of multiagent teams:
 The greatest hallenges lie in those domains with either olletive observability or
olletive partial observability and with nonzero ommuniation ost.
 Under olletive observability and olletive partial observability, teamwork without
ommuniation is highly intratable, but, with free ommuniation, the omplexity
beomes on par with that of single-agent planning problems.
 Agent team designers have muh to gain by inreasing the observational apabilities of
their team (e.g., by adding new sensor agents) beause of the redution in omplexity
gained by making the domain olletively observable.
 Furthermore, the results from Theorems 3 and 4 hold in any domain where the result
from Theorem 2 holds (i.e., when omplete ommuniation is the dominant poliy).
Therefore, while perfetly free ommuniation may be rare, these results show that
investment in ommuniation in teamwork an pay o with a signiant simpliation
of optimal teamwork.
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Individually Colletively Colletively Non-
Observable Observable Partially Observable Observable
No Comm. P-omplete NEXP-omplete NEXP-omplete NP-Complete
General Comm. P-omplete NEXP-omplete NEXP-omplete NP-Complete
Free Comm. P-omplete P-omplete PSPACE-omplete NP-Complete
Table 2: Time omplexity of COM-MTDPs.
 On the other hand, when the world is individually observable or non-observable, om-
muniation makes no dierene in performane.
 It should be noted that even under those onditions where the problem is P-omplete,
the omplexity of optimal teamwork is polynomial in the number of states of the
world, whih may still be impratially high.
 The above omplexity results pertain to nding poliies that are optimal subjet to
the domain properties. We will nd dierent expeted rewards of the optimal poliies
under dierent observability and ommuniation properties. For instane, utting o
all of the agents' sensors makes the domain non-observable and redues the omplexity
of generating an optimal poliy from NEXP to NP, but we would expet an assoiated
drop in the expeted reward ahieved by the team.
4. Evaluating Team Coordination
Table 2 shows that providing optimal domain-level and ommuniation poliies for teams is
a diÆult hallenge. Many systems alleviate this diÆulty by having domain experts pro-
vide the domain-level plans (Tambe, 1997; Tidhar, 1993). Then, the problem for the agents
redues to generating the appropriate team oordination, 

, to ensure that they prop-
erly exeute the domain-level plans, 
A
. In this setion, we demonstrate the COM-MTDP
framework's ability to analyze existing teamwork approahes in the literature. Our method-
ology for suh analysis begins by enoding suh a teamwork method as a ommuniation-
level poliy. In other words, we translate the method into an algorithm that maps agent
beliefs (e.g., observation sequenes) into ommuniation deisions. To evaluate the per-
formane of this poliy, we then instantiate a COM-MTDP that represents the states,
transition probabilities, and reward funtion of a domain of interest. Our methodology
provides an evaluation of the poliy in terms of the expeted reward earned by the team
when following the poliy in the speied domain.
We demonstrate this methodology by using our COM-MTDP framework to analyze joint
intentions theory (Cohen & Levesque, 1991b, 1991a; Levesque et al., 1990), whih provides
a ommon basis for many existing approahes to team oordination. Setion 4.1 models two
key instantiations of joint intentions taken from the literature (Jennings, 1995; Tambe, 1997)
as COM-MTDP ommuniation poliies. Setion 4.2 analyzes the onditions under whih
these poliies generate optimal behavior and provides a third andidate poliy that makes
ommuniation deisions that are loally optimal within the ontext of joint intentions. In
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addition to providing the results for the partiular team oordination strategies investigated,
this setion also illustrates a general methodology by whih one an use our COM-MTDP
framework to enode and evaluate oordination strategies proposed by existing multiagent
researh.
4.1 Joint Intentions in a COM-MTDP
Joint intention theory provides a presriptive framework for multiagent oordination in a
team setting. It does not make any laims of optimality in its teamwork, but it provides
theoretial justiations for its presriptions, grounded in the attainment of mutual belief
among the team members. We an use the COM-MTDP framework to identify the domain
properties under whih attaining mutual belief generates optimal behavior and to quantify
preisely how suboptimal the performane will be otherwise.
Joint intentions theory requires that team members jointly ommit to a joint persistent
goal, G. It also requires that when any team member privately believes that G is ahieved
(or unahievable or irrelevant), it must then attain mutual belief throughout the team
about this ahievement (or unahievability or irrelevane). To enode this presription of
joint intentions theory within our COM-MTDP model, we rst speify the joint goal, G, as
a subset of states, G  S, where the desired goal is ahieved (or unahievable or irrelevant).
Presumably, suh a presription indiates that joint intentions are not speially in-
tended for individually observable environments. Upon ahieving the goal in an individually
observable environment, eah agent would simultaneously observe that S
t
2 G. Beause
of our assumption that the COM-MTDP model omponents (inluding O

) are ommon
knowledge to the team, eah agent would also simultaneously ome to believe that its team-
mates have observed that S
t
2 G, and that its teammates believe that it believes that all
of the team members have observed that S
t
2 G, and so on. Thus, the team immediately
attains mutual belief in the ahievement of the goal under individual observability without
any additional ommuniation neessary by the team.
Instead, the joint intention framework aims at domains with some degree of unobserv-
ability. In suh domains, the agents must signal the other agents, either through ommuni-
ation or some informative domain-level ation, to attain mutual belief. However, we an
also assume that joint intention theory does not fous on domains with free ommuniation,
where Theorem 2 shows that we an simply have the agents ommuniate everything, all
the time, without the need for more omplex presriptions.
The joint intention framework does not speify a preise ommuniation poliy for the
attainment of mutual belief. In this paper, we fous on ommuniation only in the ase of
goal ahievement, but our methodology extends to handle unahievability and irrelevane as
well. One well-known approah (Jennings, 1995) applied joint intentions theory by having
the agents ommuniate the ahievement of the joint goal, G, as soon as they believe G to be
true. To instantiate the behavior of Jennings' agents within a COM-MTDP, we onstrut a
ommuniation poliy, 
J

, that speies that an agent sends the speial message, 
G
, when
it rst believes that G holds. Following joint intentions' assumption of sinerity (Smith &
Cohen, 1996), we require that the agents never selet the speial 
G
message in a belief
state unless they believe G to be true with ertainty. With this requirement and with our
assumption of the team's ommon knowledge of the ommuniation model, we an assume
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that all of the other agents immediately aept the speial message, 
G
, as true, and that
the agents know that all their team members aept the message as true, and so on. Thus,
the team attains mutual belief that G is true immediately upon reeiving the message, 
G
.
We an onstrut the ommuniation poliy, 
J

, in onstant time.
The STEAM algorithm is another instantiation of joint intentions that has had suess in
several real-world domains (Tambe, 1997; Pynadath et al., 1999; Tambe, Pynadath, Chau-
vat, Das, & Kaminka, 2000; Pynadath & Tambe, 2002). Unlike Jennings' instantiation, the
STEAM teamwork model inludes deision-theoreti ommuniation seletivity. A domain
speiation inludes two parameters for eah joint ommitment, G:  , the probability of
misoordinated termination of G; and C
mt
, the ost of misoordinated termination of G. In
this ontext, \misoordinated termination" means that some agents immediately observe
that the team has ahieved G while the rest do not. STEAM's domain speiation also
inludes a third parameter, C

, to represent the ost of ommuniation of a fat (e.g., the
ahievement of G). Using these parameters, the STEAM algorithm evaluates whether the
expeted ost of misoordination outweighs the ost of ommuniation. STEAM expresses
this riterion as the following inequality:   C
mt
> C

. We an dene a ommuniation
poliy, 
S

based on this riterion: if the inequality holds, then an agent that has observed
the ahievement of G will send the message, 
G
; otherwise, it will not. We an onstrut

S

in onstant time.
4.2 Loally Optimal Poliy
Although the STEAM poliy is more seletive than Jennings', it remains unanswered
whether it is optimally seletive, and researhers ontinue to struggle with the question
of when agents should ommuniate (Yen et al., 2001). The few reports of suboptimal
(in partiular, exessive) ommuniation in STEAM haraterized the phenomenon as an
exeptional irumstane, but it is also possible that STEAM's optimal performane is the
exeption. We use the COM-MTDP model to derive an analytial haraterization of opti-
mal ommuniation here, while Setion 5 provides an empirial one by reating an algorithm
using that haraterization.
Both poliies, 
J

, and 
S

onsider sending 
G
only when an agent rst believes that
G has been ahieved. One an agent has the relevant belief, they make dierent hoies, and
we onsider here what the optimal deision is at this point. The domain is not individually
observable, so ertain agents may be unaware of the ahievement of G. When not sending
the 
G
message, these unaware agents may unneessarily ontinue performing ations in
the pursuit of ahieving G. The performane of these extraneous ations ould potentially
inur osts and lead to a lower utility than one would expet when sending the 
G
message.
The deision to send 
G
or not matters only if the team ahieves G and one agent
omes to know this fat. We dene the random variable, T
G
, to be the earliest time at
whih an agent knows this fat. We denote agent K
G
as the agent who knows of the
ahievement at time T
G
. If K
G
= i, for some agent, i, and T
G
= t
0
, then agent i has some
pre-ommuniation belief state, b
t
0
i
= , that indiates that G has been ahieved. To more
preisely quantify the dierene between agent i sending the 
G
message at time T
G
vs.
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never sending it, we dene the following value:

T
(t
0
; i; ) E
"
T t
0
X
t=0
R
t
0
+t






t
0
i
= 
G
; T
G
= t
0
;K
G
= i; b
t
0
i
= 
#
 E
"
T t
0
X
t=0
R
t
0
+t






t
0
i
= null; T
G
= t
0
;K
G
= i; b
t
0
i
= 
#
(13)
We assume that, for all times other than T
G
, the agents follow some ommuniation poliy,


, that never speies 
G
. Thus, 
T
measures the dierene in expeted reward that
hinges on agent i's spei deision to send or not send 
G
at time t
0
. Given this denition,
it is loally optimal for agent i to send the speial message, 
G
, at time t
0
, if and only
if 
T
 0. We dene the ommuniation poliy, 
+
, as the ommuniation poliy
following 

for all agents at all times, exept for agent i under belief state , when
agent i sends message . With this denition, 
+
G
, is the poliy under whih agent i
ommuniates the ahievement of G, and 
+null
is the poliy under whih it does not.
Therefore, we an alternatively desribe agent i's deision riterion as hoosing 
+
G
over 
+null
if and only if 
T
 0.
Unfortunately, while Equation 13 identies an exat riterion for loally optimal ommu-
niation, this riterion is not yet operational. In other words, we an not diretly implement
it as a ommuniation poliy for the agents. Furthermore, Equation 13 hides the underly-
ing omplexity of the omputation involved, whih is one of the key goals of our analysis.
Therefore, we use the COM-MTDP model to derive an operational expression of 
T
 0.
For simpliity, we dene notational shorthand for various sequenes and ombinations of
values. We dene a partial sequene of random variables, X
<t
, to be the sequene of ran-
dom variables for all times before t: X
0
, X
1
, : : : , X
t 1
. We make similar denitions for the
other relational operators (i.e., X
>t
, X
t
, et.). The expression, (S)
T
, denotes the ross
produt over states of the world,
Q
T
t=0
S, as distinguished from the time-indexed random
variable, S
T
, whih denotes the value of the state at time T . The notation, s
t
0
[t℄, speies
the element in slot t within the vetor s
t
0
. We dene the funtion, , as shorthand within
our probability expressions. It allows us to ompatly represent a partiular subsequene
of world and agent belief states ourring, onditioned on the urrent situation, as follows:
Pr
 

 

t; t
0

; s;


 Pr(S
t;t
0
= s; b

t;t
0
= 



T
G
= t
0
;K
G
= i; b
t
0
i
= )
(14)
Informally,  (ht; t
0
i ; s;

) represents the event that the world and belief states from time
t through t
0
orrespond to the speied sequenes, s and 

, respetively, onditioned on
agent i being the rst to know of G's ahievement at time t
0
with a belief state, . We dene
the funtion, 

, to map a pre-ommuniation belief state into the post-ommuniation
belief state that arises from a ommuniation poliy:


(

;

)  SE

(

;

(

)) (15)
This denition of 

is a well-dened funtion beause of the deterministi nature of the
poliy, 

, and state-estimator funtion, SE

.
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Theorem 7 If we assume that, upon ahievement of G, no ommuniation other than 
G
is possible, then the ondition 
T
(t
0
,i,)  0 holds if and only if:
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Proof: The omplete proof of the following theorem appears in Online Appendix 1.
The denition of 
T
in Equation 13 is the dierene between two expetations, where eah
expetation is a sum over the possible trajetories of the agent team. Eah trajetory must
inludes a sequene of possible world states, sine the agents' reward at eah point in time
depends on the partiular state of the world at that time. The agents' reward also depends
on their ations (both domain- and ommuniation-level). These ations are deterministi,
given the agents' poliies, 
A
and 

, and their belief states. Thus, in addition to summing
over the possible states of the world, we must also sum over the possible states of the agents'
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beliefs (both pre- and post-ommuniation):
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We an rewrite these summations more simply using our various shorthand notations:
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The remaining derivation exploits our Markovian assumptions to rearrange the summations
and anel like terms to produe the theorem's result. 2
Theorem 7 states, informally, that we prefer sending 
G
whenever the the ost of exe-
ution after ahieving G outweighs the ost of ommuniation of the fat that G has been
ahieved. More preisely, the outer summations on the left-hand side of the inequality
iterate over all possible past histories of world and belief states, produing a probability
distribution over the possible states the team an be in at time t
0
. For eah suh state, the
expression inside the parentheses omputes the dierene in domain-level reward, over all
possible future sequenes of world and belief states, between sending and not sending 
G
.
By our theorem's assumption that no ommuniation other than 
G
is possible after G has
been ahieved, we an ignore any ommuniation osts in the future. However, if we relax
this assumption, we an extend the left-hand side in a straightforward manner into a longer
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Individually Colletively Colletively Non-
Observable Observable Partially Observable Observable
No Comm. 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1)
General Comm. 
(1) O((jSj  j


j)
T
) O((jSj  j


j)
T
) 
(1)
Free Comm. 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1)
Table 3: Time omplexity of loally optimal deision.
expression that aounts for the dierene in future ommuniation osts as well. Thus, the
left-hand side aptures our intuition that, when not ommuniating, the team will inur a
ost if the agents other than i are unaware of G's ahievement. The right-hand side of the
inequality is a summation of the ost of sending the 
G
message over possible urrent states
and belief states.
We an use Theorem 7 to derive the loally optimal ommuniation deision aross
various lasses of problem domains. Under no ommuniation, we annot send 
G
. Under
free ommuniation, the right-hand side is 0, so the inequality is always true, and we know
to prefer sending 
G
. Under no assumptions about ommuniation, the determination is
more ompliated. When the domain is individually observable, the left-hand side beomes
0, beause all of the agents know that G has been ahieved (and thus there is no dierene
in exeution when sending 
G
). Therefore, the inequality is always false (unless under free
ommuniation), and we prefer not sending 
G
. When the environment is not individually
observable and ommuniation is available but not free, then, to be loally optimal at time
t
0
, agent i must evaluate Inequality 16 in its full omplexity. Sine the inequality sums
rewards over all possible sequenes of states and observations, the time omplexity of the
orresponding algorithm is O((jSj  j


j)
T
). While this omplexity is unaeptable for most
real-world problems, it still provides an exponential savings over searhing the entire poliy
spae for the globally optimal poliy, where any agent ould potentially send 
G
at times
other than T
G
. Table 3 provides a table of the omplexity required to determine the loally
optimal poliy under the various domain properties.
We an now show that although Theorem 7's algorithm for loally optimal ommunia-
tion provides a signiant omputational savings over nding the global optimum, it still
outperforms existing teamwork models, as exemplied by our 
J

and 
S

poliies. First,
we an use the riterion of Theorem 7 to evaluate the optimality of the poliy, 
J

. If

T
(t
0
; i; )  0 for all possible times t
0
, agents i, and belief states  that are onsistent
with the ahievement of the goal G, then the loally optimal poliy will always speify
sending 
G
. In other words, 
J

will be idential to the loally optimal poliy. However,
if the inequality of Theorem 7 is ever false, then 
J

is not even loally, let alone globally,
optimal.
Seond, we an also use Theorem 7 to evaluate STEAM by viewing STEAM's inequality,
  C
mt
> C

, as a rude approximation of Inequality 16. In fat, there is a lear orre-
spondene between the terms in the two inequalities. The left-hand side of Inequality 16
omputes an exat expeted ost of misoordination. However, unlike STEAM's monolithi
 parameter, the optimal riterion evaluates a omplete probability distribution over all
possible states of misoordination by onsidering all possible past sequenes onsistent with
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the agent's urrent beliefs. Likewise, unlike STEAM's monolithi C
mt
parameter, the opti-
mal riterion looks ahead over all possible future sequenes of states to determine the true
expeted ost of misoordination. Furthermore, we an view STEAM's parameter, C

, as an
approximation of the ommuniation ost omputed by the right-hand side of Inequality 16.
Again, STEAM uses a single parameter, while the optimal riterion omputes an expeted
ost over all possible states of the world.
STEAM does have some exibility in its representation, beause C
mt
,  , and C

are
not neessarily xed aross the entire domain. For instane, C
mt
may vary based on the
spei joint plan that the agents may have jointly ommitted to (i.e., there may be a
dierent C
mt
for eah goal G). Thus, while Theorem 7 suggests signiant additional exi-
bility in omputing C
mt
through expliit lookahead, the optimal riterion derived with the
COM-MTDP model also provides a justiation for the overall struture behind STEAM's
approximate riterion. Furthermore, STEAM's emphasis on on-line omputation makes the
omputational omplexity of Inequality 16 (as presented in Table 3) unaeptable, so the
approximation error may be aeptable given the gains in eÆieny. For a spei domain,
we an use empirial evaluation (as demonstrated in the next setion) to quantify the error
and eÆieny to preisely judge this tradeo.
5. Empirial Poliy Evaluation
In addition to providing these analytial results over general lasses of problem domains, the
COM-MTDP framework also supports the analysis of spei domains. Given a partiular
problem domain, we an onstrut an optimal ommuniation poliy or, if the omplexity of
omputing an optimal poliy is prohibitive, we an instead evaluate and ompare andidate
approximate poliies. To provide a reusable tool for suh evaluations, we have implemented
the COM-MTDP model as a Python lass with domain-independent methods for the eval-
uation of arbitrary poliies and for the generation of both loally optimal poliies using
Theorem 7 and globally optimal poliies through brute-fore searh of the poliy spae.
This software is available in Online Appendix 1.
This setion presents results of a COM-MTDP analysis of an example domain involving
agent-piloted heliopters, where we fous on the key ommuniation deision faed by many
multiagent frameworks (as desribed in Setion 4), but vary the ost of ommuniation and
degree of observability to generate a spae of distint domains with dierent impliations
for the agents' performane. By evaluating ommuniation poliies over various ongura-
tions of this partiular testbed domain, we demonstrate a methodology by whih one an
use the COM-MTDP framework to model any problem domain and to evaluate andidate
ommuniation poliies for it.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Consider two heliopters that must y aross enemy territory to their destination, as il-
lustrated in Figure 1. The rst, piloted by agent Transport, is a transport vehile with
limited repower. The seond, piloted by agent Esort, is an esort vehile with signiant
repower. Somewhere along their path is an enemy radar unit, but its loation is unknown
(a priori) to the agents. Esort is apable of destroying the radar unit upon enountering
it. However, Transport is not, but it an esape detetion by the radar unit by traveling
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Figure 1: Illustration of heliopter team senario.
at a very low altitude (nap-of-the-earth ight), though at a lower speed than at its typial,
higher altitude. In this senario, Esort will not worry about detetion, given its superior
repower; therefore, it will y at a fast speed at its typial altitude.
The two agents form a top-level joint ommitment, G
D
, to reah their destination.
There is no inentive for the agents to ommuniate the ahievement of this goal, sine they
will both eventually reah their destination with ertainty. However, in the servie of their
top-level goal, G
D
, the two agents also adopt a joint ommitment, G
R
, of destroying the
radar unit. We onsider here the problem faing Esort with respet to ommuniating the
ahievement of goal, G
R
. If Esort ommuniates the ahievement of G
R
, then Transport
knows that it is safe to y at its normal altitude (thus reahing the destination sooner).
If Esort does not ommuniate the ahievement of G
R
, there is still some hane that
Transport will observe the event anyway. If Transport does not observe the ahievement
of G
R
, then it must y nap-of-the-earth the whole distane, and the team reeives a lower
reward beause of the later arrival. Therefore, Esort must weigh the inrease in expeted
reward against the ost of ommuniation.
In the COM-MTDP model of this senario (presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4), the world
state is the position (along a straight line between origin and destination) of Transport,
Esort, and the enemy radar. The enemy is at a randomly seleted position somewhere
in between the agents' initial position and their destination. Transport has no possible
ommuniation ations, but it an hoose between two domain-level ations: ying nap-of-
the-earth and ying at its normal speed and altitude. Esort has two domain-level ations:
ying at its normal speed and destroying the radar. Esort also has the option of ommuni-
ating the speial message, 
G
R
, indiating that the radar has been destroyed. In the tables
of Figures 2, 3 and 4, the \" symbol represents a wild-ard (or \don't are") entry.
If Esort arrives at the radar, then it observes its presene with ertainty and an
destroy it to ahieve G
R
. The likelihood of Transport's observing the radar's destrution is
a funtion of its distane from the radar. We an vary this funtion's observability parameter
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Figure 2: COM-MTDP model of states, ations, and rewards for heliopter senario.
( in Figure 4) within the range [0; 1℄ to generate distint domain ongurations (0 means
that Transport will never observe the radar's destrution; 1 means Transport will always
observe it). If the observability is 1, then they ahieve mutual belief of the ahievement of
G
R
as soon as it ours (following the argument presented in Setion 4.1). However, for any
observability less than 1, there is a hane that the agents will not ahieve mutual belief
simply by ommon observation. The heliopters reeive a xed reward for eah time step
spent at their destination. Thus, for a xed time horizon, the earlier the heliopters reah
there, the greater the team's reward. Sine ying nap-of-the-earth is slower than normal
speed, Transport will swith to its normal ying as soon as it either observes that G
R
has
been ahieved or Esort sends the message, 
G
R
. Sending the message is not free, so we
impose a variable ommuniation ost (r

in Figure 2), also within the range [0; 1℄.
We onstruted COM-MTDP models of this senario for eah ombination of observabil-
ity and ommuniation ost within the range [0; 1℄ at 0.1 inrements. For eah ombination,
we applied the Jennings and STEAM poliies, as well as a ompletely silent poliy. For this
domain, the poliy, 
J

, ditates that Esort always ommuniate 
G
R
upon destroying
the radar. For STEAM, we vary the  and C

parameters with the observability and om-
muniation ost parameters, respetively. We used two dierent settings (low and medium)
for the ost of misoordination, C
mt
. Following the published STEAM algorithm (Tambe,
1997), Esort sends message 
G
R
if and only if STEAM's inequality   C
mt
> C

, holds.
Thus, the two dierent settings, low and medium, for C
mt
generate two distint ommunia-
tion poliies; the high setting is stritly dominated by the other two settings in this domain.
We also onstruted and evaluated loally and globally optimal poliies. In applying eah
of these poliies, we used our COM-MTDP model to ompute the expeted reward reeived
by the team when following the seleted poliy. We an uniquely determine this expeted
reward given the andidate ommuniation poliy and the partiular observability and om-
muniation ost parameters, as well as the COM-MTDP model speied in Figures 2, 3,
and 4.
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Figure 3: COM-MTDP model of transition probabilities for heliopter senario (exludes
zero probability rows).
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Figure 4: COM-MTDP model of observability for heliopter senario. These tables ex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tions are independent of the
transport's sele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Figure 5: Suboptimality of silent and Jennings poliies.
Figure 6: Suboptimality of STEAM poliy under both low and medium osts of misoordi-
nation.
5.2 Experimental Results
Figures 5 and 6 plot how muh utility the team an expet to lose by following the Jennings,
silent, and the two STEAM poliies instead of the loally optimal ommuniation poliy
(thus, higher values mean worse performane). We an immediately see that the Jennings
and silent poliies are signiantly suboptimal for many possible domain ongurations. For
example, not surprisingly, the surfae for the poliy, 
J

, peaks (i.e., it does most poorly)
when the ommuniation ost is high and when the observability is high, while the silent
poliy does poorly under exatly the opposite onditions.
Previously published results (Jennings, 1995) demonstrated that the Jennings poliy
led to better team performane by reduing waste of eort produed by alternate poliies
like our silent one. These earlier results foused on a single domain, and Figure 5 partially
onrms their onlusion and shows that the superiority of the Jennings poliy over the
silent poliy extends over a broad range of possible domain ongurations. On the other
hand, our COM-MTDP results also show that there is a signiant sublass of domains (e.g.,
when ommuniation ost and observability are high) where the Jennings poliy is atually
inferior to the silent poliy. Thus, with our COM-MTDP model, we an haraterize the
types of domains where the Jennings poliy outperforms the silent poliy and vie versa.
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Figure 6 shows the expeted value lost by following the two STEAM poliies. We an
view STEAM as trying to intelligently interpolate between the Jennings and silent poliies
based on the partiular domain properties. In fat, under a low setting for C
mt
, we see
two thresholds, one along eah dimension, at whih STEAM swithes between following the
Jennings and silent poliies, and its suboptimality is highest at these thresholds. Under
a medium setting for C
mt
, STEAM does not exhibit a threshold along the dimension of
ommuniation ost, due to the inreased ost of misoordination. Under both settings,
STEAM's performane generally follows the better of those two xed poliies, so its maxi-
mum suboptimality (0.587 under both settings) is signiantly lower than that of the silent
(0.700) and Jennings' (1.000) poliies. Furthermore, STEAM outperforms the two poliies
on average, aross the spae of domain ongurations, as evidened by its mean subopti-
mality of 0.063 under low C
mt
and 0.083 under medium C
mt
. Both values are signiantly
lower than the silent poliy's mean of 0.160 and the Jennings' poliy's mean of 0.161. Thus,
we have been able to quantify the savings provided by STEAM over less seletive poliies
within this example domain.
However, within a given domain onguration, STEAM must either always or never
ommuniate, and this inexibility leads to signiant suboptimality aross a wide range
of domain ongurations. On the other hand, Figure 6 also shows that there are domain
ongurations where STEAM is loally optimal. In this relatively small-sale experimental
testbed, there is no need to inur STEAM's suboptimality, beause the agents an ompute
the superior loally optimal poliy in under 5 seonds. In larger-sale domains, on the other
hand, the inreased omplexity of the loally optimal poliies may render its exeution
infeasible. In suh domains, STEAM's onstant-time exeution would potentially make it a
preferable alternative. This analysis suggests a possible spetrum of algorithms that make
dierent optimality-eÆieny tradeos.
To understand the ause of STEAM's suboptimality, we an examine its performane
more deeply in Figures 7 and 8, whih plot the expeted number of messages sent using
STEAM (with both low and medium C
mt
) vs. the loally optimal poliy, at observability
values of 0.3 and 0.7. STEAM's expeted number of messages is either 0 or 1, so STEAM
an make at most two (instantaneous) transitions between them: one threshold value eah
along the observability and ommuniation ost dimensions.
From Figures 7 and 8, we see that the optimal poliy an be more exible than STEAM
by speifying ommuniation ontingent on Esort's beliefs beyond simply the ahievement
of G
R
. For example, onsider the messages sent under low C
mt
in Figure 7, where STEAM
mathes the loally optimal poliy at the extremes of the ommuniation ost dimension.
Even if the ommuniation ost is high, it is still worth sending message 
G
R
in states where
Transport is still very far from the destination. Thus, the surfae for the optimal poliy,
makes a more gradual transition from always ommuniating to never ommuniating. We
an thus view STEAM's surfae as a rude approximation to the optimal surfae, subjet
to STEAM's fewer degrees of freedom.
We an also use Figures 7 and 8 to identify the domain onditions under whih joint
intentions theory's presription of attaining mutual belief is or is not optimal. In partiular,
for any domain where the observability is less than 1, the agents will not attain mutual belief
without ommuniation. In both Figures 7 and 8, there are many domain ongurations
where the loally optimal poliy is expeted to send fewer than 1 
G
R
message. Eah of
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Figure 7: Expeted number of messages sent by STEAM and loally optimal poliies when
the observability is 0.3.
Figure 8: Expeted number of messages sent by STEAM and loally optimal poliies when
the observability is 0.7. Under both settings, STEAM sends 0 messages.
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Figure 9: Suboptimality of loally optimal poliy.
these ongurations represents a domain where the loally optimal poliy will not attain
mutual belief in at least one ase. Therefore, attaining mutual belief is suboptimal in those
ongurations!
These experiments illustrate that STEAM, despite its deision-theoreti ommuniation
seletivity, may ommuniate suboptimally under a signiant lass of domain ongura-
tions. Previous work on STEAM-based, real-world, agent-team implementations informally
noted suboptimality in an isolated onguration within a more realisti heliopter trans-
port domain (Tambe, 1997). Unfortunately, this previous work treated that suboptimality
(where the agents ommuniated more than neessary) as an isolated aberration, so there
was no investigation of the degree of suh suboptimality, nor of the onditions under whih
suh suboptimality may our in pratie. We re-reated these onditions within the experi-
mental testbed of this setion by using a medium C
mt
. The resulting experiments (as shown
in Figure 7) illustrated that the observed suboptimality was not an isolated phenomenon,
but, in fat, that STEAM has a general propensity towards extraneous ommuniation in
situations involving low observability (i.e., low likelihood of mutual belief) and high om-
muniation osts. This result mathes the situation where the \aberration" ourred in the
more realisti domain.
The loally optimal poliy is itself suboptimal with respet to the globally optimal
poliy, as we an see from Figure 9. Under domain ongurations with high observability,
the globally optimal poliy has the esort wait an additional time step after destroying
the radar and then ommuniate only if the transport ontinues ying nap-of-the-earth.
The esort annot diretly observe whih method of ight the transport has hosen, but
it an measure the hange in the transport's position (sine it maintains a history of its
past observations) and thus infer the method of ight with omplete auray. In a sense,
the esort following the globally optimal poliy is performing plan reognition to analyze
the transport's possible beliefs. It is partiularly noteworthy that our domain speiation
does not expliitly enode this reognition apability. In fat, our algorithm for nding the
globally optimal poliy does not even make any of the assumptions made by our loally
observable poliy (i.e., single agent is deiding whether to ommuniate or not, regarding
a single message, at a single point in time); rather, our general-purpose searh algorithm
traverses the poliy spae and \disovers" this possible means of inferene on its own. We
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expet that suh COM-MTDP analysis an provide an automati method for disovering
novel ommuniation poliies of this type in other domains, even those modeling real-world
problems.
Indeed, by exploiting this disovery apability within our example domain, the globally
optimal poliy gains a slight advantage in expeted utility over the loally optimal poliy,
with a mean dierene of 0.011, standard deviation of 0.027, and maximum of 0.120. On the
other hand, our domain-independent ode never requires more than 5 seonds to ompute
the loally optimal poliy in this testbed, while our domain-independent searh algorithm
always required more than 150 minutes to nd the globally optimal poliy. Thus, through
Theorem 7, we have used the COM-MTDP model to onstrut a ommuniation poliy
that, for this testbed domain, performs almost optimally and outperforms existing team-
work theories, with a substantial omputational savings over nding the globally optimal
poliy. Although these results hold for an isolated ommuniation deision, we expet the
relative performane of the poliies to stay the same even with multiple deisions, where the
inexibility of the suboptimal poliies will only exaerbate their losses (i.e., the shapes of
the graphs would stay roughly the same, but the suboptimality magnitudes would inrease).
6. Summary
The COM-MTDP model is a novel framework that omplements existing teamwork researh
by providing the previously laking apability to analyze the optimality and omplexity of
team deisions. While grounded within eonomi team theory, the COM-MTDP's exten-
sions to inlude ommuniation and dynamism allow it to subsume many existing multiagent
models. We were able to exploit the COM-MTDP's ability to represent broad lasses of
multiagent team domains to derive omplexity results for optimal agent teamwork under
arbitrary problem domains. We also used the model to identify domain properties that an
simplify that omplexity.
The COM-MTDP framework provides a general methodology for analysis aross both
general domain sublasses and spei domain instantiations. As demonstrated in Setion 4,
we an express important existing teamwork theories within a COM-MTDP framework and
derive broadly appliable theoretial results about their optimality. Setion 5 demonstrates
our methodology for the analysis of a spei domain. By enoding a teamwork problem as
a COM-MTDP, we an use the leverage of our general-purpose software tools (available in
Online Appendix 1) to evaluate the optimality of teamwork based on potentially any other
existing theory, as demonstrated in this paper using two leading instantiations of joint
intentions theory. In ombining both theory and pratie, we an use the theoretial results
derived using the COM-MTDP framework as the basis for new algorithms to extend our
software tools, just as we did in translating Theorem 7 from Setion 4 into an implemented
algorithm for loally optimal ommuniation in Setion 5. We expet that the COM-MTDP
framework, the theorems and omplexity results, and the reusable software will form a basis
for further analysis of teamwork, both by ourselves and others in the eld.
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7. Future Work for COM-MTDP Team Analysis
While our initial COM-MTDP results are promising, there remain at least three key areas
where future progress in COM-MTDPs is ritial. First, analysis using COM-MTDPs (suh
as the one presented in Setion 5) requires knowledge of the rewards, transition probabil-
ities, and observation probabilities, as well as of the ompeting poliies governing agent
behavior. It may not always be possible to have suh a model of the domain and agents'
poliies readily available. Indeed, other proposed team-analysis tehniques (Nair, Tambe,
Marsella, & Raines, 2002b; Raines, Tambe, & Marsella, 2000), do not require a priori hand-
oding of suh models, but rather aquire them automatially through mahine learning
over large numbers of runs. Also, in the interests of ombating omputational omplexity
and improved understandability, some researhers emphasize the need for multiple models
at multiple levels of abstration, rather than fousing on a single model (Nair et al., 2002b).
For instane, one level of the model may fous on the analysis of the individual agents' a-
tions in support of a team, while another level may fous on interations among subteams
of a team. We an potentially extend the COM-MTDP model in both of these diretions
(i.e., mahine learning of model parameters, and hierarhial representations of the team to
provide multiple levels of abstration).
Seond, it is important to extend COM-MTDP analysis to other aspets of teamwork
beyond ommuniation. For instane, team formation (where agents may be assigned spe-
i roles within the team) and reformation (where failure of individual agents leads to role
reassignment within in the team) are key problems in teamwork that appear suitable for
COM-MTDP analysis. Suh analysis may require extensions to the COM-MTDP frame-
work (e.g., expliit modeling of roles). Ongoing researh (Nair, Tambe, & Marsella, 2002a)
has begun investigating the impat of suh extensions and their appliations in domains
suh as RoboCup Resue (Kitano, Tadokoro, Noda, Matsubara, Takahashi, Shinjoh, & Shi-
mada, 1999). Analysis of more omplex team behaviors may require further extensions
to the COM-MTDP model to expliitly aount for additional aspets of teamwork (e.g.,
notions of authority struture within teams).
Third, extending COM-MTDP analysis beyond teamwork to model other types of o-
ordination may require relaxation of COM-MTDP's assumption of seless agents reeiving
the same joint reward. More omplex organizations may require modeling other non-joint
rewards. Indeed, enrihing the COM-MTDP model in this manner may enable analy-
sis of some of the seminal work in multiagent oordination in the tradition of PGP and
GPGP (Deker & Lesser, 1995; Durfee & Lesser, 1991). Suh enrihed models may rst
require new advanes in the mathematial foundations of our COM-MTDP framework, and
ultimately ontribute towards the emerging sienes of agents and multiagent systems.
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